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Aesthetics in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein 





In Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein the brilliant scientist Viktor Frankenstein constructs and animates a 
gigantic and superhumanly powerful man. But upon animation, Frankenstein discovers he neglected 
beauty, and beholding his hideous creation flees in horror without even naming the man. Abandoned 
and alone the monster leaves society, yet secretly observing humanity learns language and 
philosophy and eventually discovers humanity’s self-understanding and his own self-understanding 
to be grounded in beauty rather than reason. 
 
 
When I placed my head on my pillow, I did not sleep, nor could I be said to think. My 
imagination, unbidden, possessed and guided me, gifting the successive images that 
arose in my mind with a vividness far beyond the usual bounds of reverie. I saw – with 
shut eyes, but acute mental vision – I saw the pale student of unhallowed arts kneeling 
beside the thing he had put together. I saw the hideous phantasm of a man stretched 
out, and then, on the working of some powerful engine, show signs of life, and stir with 
an uneasy, half-vital motion. 
— Mary Shelley, Frankenstein, Author’s Introduction (8–9) 
1. Shelley’s Dream 
In her Author’s Introduction Mary Shelley recalls the half-waking dream that would 
become her brilliant philosophical science fiction novel Frankenstein, or The Modern 
Prometheus. The “pale student of unhallowed arts” would become the great scientist and 
modern Prometheus, Viktor Frankenstein, and the “hideous phantasm of a man stretched 
out” upon the “powerful engine” would become the infamous and terrifying monster. In the 
novel Frankenstein reverse engineers (engineering by copying form) an artificial man from 
parts of men and animals and then animates and awakens the assemblage of nonliving 
parts. But in the moment of animation, when the artificial man rises and opens his eyes and 
beholds his creator, Frankenstein discovers his creation to be the most horribly hideous 
thing in the world. Frankenstein, unable to bear the aesthetic horror, flees without naming 
the artificial man or teaching him to speak or survive on his own. If Adam and Eve with 
their sudden self-consciousness found themselves abandoned and exiled from the Garden 
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of Eden, and forced to form the first civilization, then at the height of that same civilization 
this new and unnamed artificial Adam, without self-consciousness, now finds himself 
abandoned and alone, and forced into the wilderness, for none can behold him except in 
mortal horror. But in the wilderness, and gazing like a scientist on civilization, the artificial 
man acquires language, and even learns philosophy, and ultimately discovers the true 
nature of humanity. Instead of the rational animal humanity has always taken itself to be, 
the artificial man discovers humanity to be the aesthetic animal enamored of the magical 
power of beauty, and himself tragically no part of humanity. 
The present essay develops this philosophical interpretation of Frankenstein 
according to the following structure. Section 2, “Creation and Discovery of the Monster” 
describes Frankenstein’s method of construction and subsequent discovery of his failure to 
form the artificial man as beautiful. Section 3, “The Beautiful, the Sublime, and the Monster” 
examines the aesthetic problem of the monster in relation to Aristotle’s theory of the 
beautiful, and the theory of the sublime in Longinus, Edmund Burke, Immanuel Kant, and 
George Santayana. Section 4, “Viktor Frankenstein on the Beautiful and the Sublime” 
examines Frankenstein’s own philosophical study of mountains and ruined castles as 
beautiful and sublime. Section 5, “The Monster in the Mountains” examines the destruction 
of Frankenstein’s aesthetic experience with the appearance of the monster in the 
mountains. Section 6, “The Monster’s Philosophy” examines the meeting of the man and the 
monster in the mountains, where the monster eloquently unfolds his heartbreaking story, 
his hard-won philosophical understanding of the true nature of humanity, his painful 
acceptance of permanent exile, and finally his request that Frankenstein form for him a 
female monster so they two may leave civilization for the wilderness. Section 7 concludes 
the essay. 
2. Creation and Discovery of the Monster 
Originally Frankenstein intended to give the artificial man normal size but the human 
biological form is composed of very minute parts intricately connected and difficult to 
handle. 
As the minuteness of the parts formed a great hindrance to my speed, I resolved, 
contrary to my first intention, to make the being of a gigantic stature; that is to say, 
about eight feet in height, and proportionably large. (Shelley, 52)  
Frankenstein uses parts of large human cadavers and other large animals as may be found 
in the slaughterhouse such as pigs and cattle and horses. As Frankenstein recalls, “The 
dissecting room and the slaughter-house furnished many of my materials” (53). Anyone 
might feel disgust at these organs and bones and blood of different species categorized and 
meticulously prepared for some terrible laboratory synthesis, but Frankenstein delights in 
the correspondence of anatomical parts of different animals, and how they may be fit 
together to form a new kind of being. As a scientist Frankenstein examines the anatomical 
parts in almost purely mechanical terms and apparently without vision of their final 
aesthetic design except a general proportionality necessary for functionality of form. 
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But in the moment the dead mass of parts wakes and breathes and slowly moves 
Frankenstein’s pride and elation become terror and disgust. Frankenstein says, “I saw the 
dull yellow eye of the creature open; it breathed hard, and a convulsive motion agitated its 
limbs” (56). As Frankenstein looks into the living and dead yellow eyes he sees death itself 
staring back at him. 
His yellow skin scarcely covered the work of muscles and arteries beneath; his hair 
was of a lustrous black, and flowing; his teeth of pearly whiteness; but these 
luxuriances only formed a more horrid contrast with his watery eyes, that seemed 
almost of the same colour as the dun-white sockets in which they were set, his 
shriveled complexion and straight black lips. (56) 
Everything about the artificial man is inhuman and all that appears to be human and even 
otherwise beautiful only exacerbates the inhumanity of his appearance by identity with 
humanity. The teeth “of pearly whiteness” and hair “a lustrous black, and flowing” might 
add beauty to a handsome man or beautiful woman, but instead render the artificial man 
even more visually confusing and disgusting. The face and body appear to be a patchwork 
of pieces of so many species in a foul tangle of traits and hideous stitchery. Frankenstein 
has worked only with material and efficient causality, in Aristotle’s sense in the Physics, and 
not the final causality revealed in all the magical masks of form and light worn by nature’s 
wondrously beautiful creatures, especially man and woman. 
The once proud scientist beholds his creation in terror and disgust, but also 
disturbed confusion at how he, Frankenstein, with such brilliant eyes and masterful hands, 
could have made such a horrible thing. Frankenstein says, “I beheld the wretch – the 
miserable monster whom I had created. He held up the curtain of the bed; and his eyes, if 
eyes they may be called, were fixed on me” (Shelley, 57). As Harold Bloom writes in his 
Introduction to his edited volume of critical essays, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, “When the 
‘dull yellow eye’ of his creature opens, this creator falls from the autonomy of a supreme 
artificer to the terror of a child of earth: ‘breathless horror and disgust filled my heart’” 
(Bloom, 6–7). Denise Gigante in “Facing the Ugly: The Case of Frankenstein” similarly 
highlights the scene of the “dull yellow eye” strangely “‘doubling from a single yellow eye’ 
to two ‘watery eyes’” (Gigante, 571). Gigante writes of Frankenstein, “He notices with 
disgust how the eyeballs are lost in the murkiness, the ‘dun-white’ of their surrounding 
sockets, and he even doubts ‘if eyes they may be called’” (571). The monster’s eyes look like 
dead watery blobs of opaque yellow glop, failing in color and form and depth, somehow 
mechanically capable of sight but without glow as index of a man. Floating lost in their 
murkiness, without reason informing sight with concepts, these eyes know not they are 
dead. And yet, the monster beholds the man, and apparently by nature smiles happily like a 
child, and even tries to speak, but already Frankenstein draws back in hatred. 
His jaws opened, and he muttered some inarticulate sounds, while a grin wrinkled 
his cheeks. He might have spoken, but I did not hear; one hand was stretched out, 
seemingly to detain me, but I escaped, and rushed downstairs. (Shelley, 57) 
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The monster beholds his father, but Frankenstein beholds neither his son nor a man but 
horror itself in the shape of a man and speechless runs. Frankenstein may appear 
detestable for his abandonment if not for his creation of the monster, but any man would 
run or worse. 
According to Noël Carroll in “The Nature of Horror,” “Many monsters of the horror 
genre are interstitial and/or contradictory in terms of being both living and dead: ghosts, 
zombies, vampires, mummies, the Frankenstein monster, Melmoth, and so on” (Carroll, 55). 
Frankenstein himself describes the monster in exactly these terms, as alive and dead at 
once, and even calls the monster a “mummy” and a “demonaical corpse” (Shelley, 57). 
Oh! no mortal could support the horror of that countenance. A mummy again 
endued with animation could not be so hideous as that wretch. I had gazed on him 
while unfinished; he was ugly then; but when those muscles and joints were 
rendered capable of motion, it became a thing such as even Dante could not have 
conceived. (57) 
Frankenstein’s description may seem excessive compared to Dante Alighieri’s terrifying 
monsters in the Inferno, in The Divine Comedy, like the Gorgon Medusa whose eyes once 
seen turn men to stone (Dante, Inferno IX, lines 46–60), those eyes that contrast with the 
perfectly beautiful glowing eyes of his beloved Beatrice in the Garden of Eden atop the 
mountain of Purgatory which “transhumanize” Dante in preparation for his flight through 
Paradise (Paradiso I, lines 67–72). But Dante traversing the underworld need not behold 
himself as if in an ontological mirror beholding these terrifying yet imprisoned monsters, 
while that is precisely Frankenstein’s experience in beholding his creation now alive and 
free to roam the Earth. Frankenstein beholds in the monster a seemingly infinitely 
shattered and horrifying kaleidoscopic mirror image of humanity, and by this very identity 
and hideous non-identity with humanity the monster undermines the unity and goodness 
of humanity. Every man beholds himself in ontological reflection in the eyes of every other 
man and woman, but no man can behold himself except in absolute terror in beholding the 
face and form of the monster. His face in the light carries pain to the eye. 
Frankenstein’s discovery of what he has done and not done forces a reversal of 
direction of action of plot, consistent with Aristotle’s theory of tragedy in the Poetics. 
According to Aristotle, a tragedy is an imitation of a whole action in which a good man’s 
error or fault causes him to fall terribly from good to bad fortune. In Poetics 11 Aristotle 
claims the tragic plot action reversal to be best when attended by a simultaneous 
“discovery.” 
A discovery is, as the very word implies, a change from ignorance to knowledge, and 
thus to either love or hate, in the personages marked for good or evil fortune. The 
finest form of discovery is one attended by reversal, like that which goes with the 
discovery in Oedipus. (Aristotle, vol. 2, 1451a30–34, 2324) 
In Sophocles’s Oedipus the King the good king Oedipus once saved Thebes by solving the 
riddle of the Sphinx with self-knowledge. But now Thebes starves and sickens and dies 
because the murder mystery of the last king, Laios, remains unsolved; so Oedipus, proud of 
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his intellect, vows to solve the mystery. Oedipus consults the blind but all-seeing prophet 
Teiresias, but Teiresias refuses assistance, so Oedipus insults Teiresias for blindness, and 
then Teiresias insults Oedipus for mental blindness. Teiresias knows Oedipus to be the 
very man he seeks. Oedipus unknowingly murdered his father the king, and then married 
his mother the queen with whom he fathered his siblings. But the mentally blind detective 
Oedipus eventually uncovers the truth, and finally sees with the eyes of Teiresias: “Now 
everything is clear” (Sophocles, 77). In the moment Oedipus discovers himself to be the 
murderer, the action of the plot reverses. His wife and mother Queen Jocasta hangs herself, 
and Oedipus beholding her hanged removes her long gold pins from her gown, and plunges 
them deep into his eyeballs. Finally Oedipus leaves Thebes in exile, as blind as Teiresias, 
pitiably knowing all. 
Like Oedipus, Frankenstein is proud of his intellect, and similarly blind to his actions 
(at least while he performs them), and in the moment of self-discovery the plot reverses 
against him as well. In this moment of discovery Frankenstein suffers both changes 
Aristotle identifies for the tragic hero. Frankenstein passes from ignorance to knowledge of 
his creation and himself, and from love to hate of his creation and himself. But 
Frankenstein’s discovery is not quite a philosophically reflective discovery because, while 
he knows he neglected beauty, he knows not yet the all-importance of beauty to the 
identity of humanity. But the monster will make precisely this discovery upon beholding 
himself with the eyes of a philosopher, and this discovery will also carry unbearable pity 
and terror, which are the primary emotions of all great tragedies (such as Oedipus the 
King), according to Aristotle in Poetics 6, 11, and 14 (e.g., 1449b24–28, 2320). 
3. The Beautiful, the Sublime, and the Monster 
According to Aristotle in Metaphysics XIII.3, “The chief forms of beauty are order and 
symmetry and definiteness, which the mathematical sciences demonstrate in a special 
degree” (Aristotle, vol. 1, 1078a36–1078b1, 1075). For example, the objects of geometry 
such as the sphere and the cube and the pyramid with their symmetry and order and 
wondrous elegance of line especially reveal the beautiful. But in Frankenstein the monster’s 
lines seem to be scribbled and scratched and blotted so haphazardly not even in negation 
can they reveal the beautiful. In Poetics 7 Aristotle applies his mathematical aesthetics to 
animals: 
Again: to be beautiful, a living creature, and every whole made up of parts, must not 
only present a certain order in its arrangement of parts, but also be of a certain 
definite magnitude. Beauty is a matter of size and order, and therefore impossible 
either in a very minute creature, since our perception becomes indistinct as it 
approaches instantaneity; or in a creature of vast size—one, say, 1000 miles long—
as in that case, instead of the object being seen all at once, the unity and wholeness 
of it is lost to the beholder. (Aristotle, vol. 2, 1450b34–1451a2, 2322)  
To be beautiful a creature must not be too small or too large because it must be perceivable 
as a whole form, and the whole form must also reveal unity among the parts, and the 
wholeness of the creature must predominate over the parts, which serve the unity of the 
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whole. If the creature is too small, then it cannot be seen as a whole with good arrangement 
of parts, e.g., a clover mite. If the creature is too large, then it cannot be seen as a whole at 
all, and only the parts appear, e.g., Aristotle’s imaginary creature, a thousand miles long. 
(For perspective, Earth’s moon’s radius is 1,079 miles long, so Aristotle’s imaginary 
creature is about half the diameter of the moon.) In Frankenstein the monster is large but 
not colossal, so he can be seen as a whole form, but the parts appear hatefully assembled 
and violently disarranged, and therefore predominate over the wholeness of form. The 
monstrous man is not one man but many men and many animals dead and dismembered 
and reassembled and revealing everywhere sour asymmetry and ontological jumble. 
The monster’s great size only renders this horrible disarrangement more horrible. If 
the monster were well formed, then his great magnitude might render him brilliantly 
handsome, perhaps like the “great-souled man” in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics IV.3 
(Aristotle, vol. 2, 1123b5–7 and 30, 1773). But instead the monster’s magnitude 
exacerbates his inhuman hideousness and renders him sensuously violent. At eight feet in 
height with elephantine size and superhuman strength the monster inhabits the ambiguous 
space between man and giant and this ambiguity augments the horror of his appearance 
with confusion. In fact, the monster appears to be “interstitial” (or self-contradictory), in 
Carroll’s terms in “The Nature of Horror,” in several ways. The monster is alive and dead, a 
giant and not a giant, a man and not a man, and one and many men and beasts, all at once. 
And yet, for all his disturbing ambiguity, he is unambiguously and absolutely hideous, and 
this hideousness alone renders him a monster. As Bloom writes, “a beautiful ‘monster’ or 
even a passable one, would not have been a monster” (Bloom, 7; see also Gigante, 568). 
According to Aristotle in Physics II.8, a monster is a mistake made by nature in 
forming an animal. As Aristotle writes, “monstrosities will be failures in the purposive 
effort” (Aristotle, vol. 1, 199b4, 340). Frankenstein’s original purpose, as he recalls (at the 
end of the novel), was to make a “rational animal,” using the traditional Aristotelian 
language: “When I reflected on the work I had completed, no less a one than the creation of 
a sensitive and rational animal, I could not rank myself with the herd of common 
projectors” (Shelley, 204). “In a fit of enthusiastic madness, I created a rational creature,” 
Frankenstein again recalls (209). But Frankenstein’s neglect of beauty undermines this 
original purpose of forming a “rational animal” or “rational creature.” To be a rational 
creature one must develop one’s reason with others and live with others in society. But the 
monster cannot be recognized aesthetically as a man, so he cannot live in society, and 
therefore cannot be human. But Frankenstein’s deformation of the artificial man also 
deforms society, and even nature as a whole. A man is a whole of parts, but a man is also a 
part of the whole of society, and this whole of society is itself a part of the whole of nature. 
So, by deranging the parts of the artificial man, Frankenstein deranges the whole man, and, 
by deranging the whole man, Frankenstein deranges the social practices of recognition 
foundational to society (for none can behold the artificial man except in terror and disgust), 
and by deranging the whole of society, Frankenstein further deranges nature itself, nature 
which acts for the beautiful in all her parts and wholes. As Aristotle writes in Parts of 
Animals I.5, 
Abrams: Aesthetics in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein 
 




Every realm of nature is marvellous: and as Heraclitus, when the strangers who 
came to visit him found him warming himself at the furnace in the kitchen and 
hesitated to go in, is reported to have bidden them not to be afraid to enter, as even 
in that kitchen divinities were present, so we should venture on the study of every 
kind of animal without distaste; for each and all will reveal to us something natural 
and something beautiful. Absence of haphazard and conduciveness of everything to 
an end are to be found in nature’s works in the highest degree, and the end for 
which those works are put together and produced is a form of the beautiful. 
(Aristotle, vol. 1, 645a16–25, 1004) 
Ralph Waldo Emerson echoes this view in Nature: “The ancient Greeks called the world 
κόσμος, beauty” (Emerson, 12). Every form of nature reveals the beautiful through its 
“absence of haphazardness” (elegance), but the monster is inelegant in the extreme 
because his form is a study in haphazardness and distortion. But if nature forms in all her 
parts the beautiful, and the parts together form a whole which also reveals a form of the 
beautiful (to be contemplated philosophically), then a gigantic and terrifyingly hideous 
man also appears to distort the whole of nature. That anyway appears to be the way 
Frankenstein sees the monster. 
4. Viktor Frankenstein on the Beautiful and the Sublime 
Despite his early blindness to the power of beauty in nature, Frankenstein retreats from 
society to the mountains to behold their wondrous beauty, and ultimately to forget himself 
and his terrible act against nature. Frankenstein records a marvelous scene. 
The immense mountains and precipices that overhung me on every side – the sound 
of the river raging among the rocks, and the dashing of the waterfalls around, spoke 
of a power mighty as Omnipotence – and I ceased to fear, or to bend before any 
being less almighty than that which created and ruled the elements, here displayed 
in their most terrific guise. Still, as I ascended higher, the valley assumed a more 
magnificent and astonishing character. Ruined castles hanging on the precipices of 
piny mountains; the impetuous Arve, and cottages every here and there peeping 
forth from among the trees, formed a scene of singular beauty. But it was 
augmented and rendered sublime by the mighty Alps, whose white and shining 
pyramids and domes towered above all, as belonging to another earth, the 
habitations of another race of beings. (Shelley, 91)  
The mad scientist who built the most hideous and disgusting thing in the world would 
appear to be terribly disturbed and incapable of aesthetic sensitivity or refined aesthetic 
judgment. But now Frankenstein describes the surrounding mountains and castles with 
penetrating aesthetic perception, almost like a philosophical art critic of otherworldly 
architecture. In fact, Frankenstein beholds the whole stunningly beautiful scene with the 
self-sufficient and complete contemplative aesthetic pleasure of Aristotle’s philosopher in 
the Nicomachean Ethics X.4, and even the superhuman intellectual pleasure of Aristotle’s 
godlike philosopher in the Nicomachean Ethics X.7–8. Yet Frankenstein’s description also 
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bears stunning resemblance to Kant’s study of mountains, cliffs, waterfalls, and lightning, as 
examples of sublimity in nature, in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. Here Kant writes, 
Bold, overhanging, as it were threatening cliffs, thunder clouds towering up into the 
heavens, bringing with them flashes of lightning and crashes of thunder, volcanoes 
with their all-destroying violence, hurricanes with the devastation they leave 
behind, the boundless ocean set into a rage, a lofty waterfall on a mighty river, etc., 
make our capacity to resist into an insignificant trifle in comparison with their 
power. (Kant, 2001, 5: 261, 144) 
As Kant describes “Bold, overhanging, as it were threatening cliffs,” Frankenstein describes 
“The immense mountains and precipices that overhung me on every side.” And as Kant 
describes “the boundless ocean set into a rage,” and “a lofty waterfall on a mighty river,” 
Frankenstein describes “the sound of the river raging among the rocks, and the dashing of 
the waterfalls around.” 
At first, Frankenstein beholds the mountains as sublime, but then his attention turns 
to the beautiful castles, and then returns to the mountains—seemingly carrying the 
concept of dwelling back through analogy through the imagination—to behold the 
mountains now as sublimely beautiful “white and shining pyramids,” apparently crafted by 
the superhuman hands of “another race of beings” from “another earth.” Frankenstein then 
returns his perception to the beautiful castles, which now appear to be informed by the 
sublime beauty of the superhuman dwellings, i.e., the mountains. The beautiful castles have 
been “rendered sublime by the mighty Alps,” as the sublime Alps have been rendered 
beautiful by the “ruined castles.” The beauty of the castles, and the sublimity of the 
mountains, each at first appears distinct, but then synthesize (in Frankenstein’s 
imagination) to form one complete and self-sufficient aesthetic experience of sublime 
beauty. The beauty of the castles is not separate from the sublimity of the mountains, and 
the castles as dwellings are not essentially different from the mountains, which also appear 
as dwellings. The sublime beauty of the mountains is superhuman, and the mountains 
themselves are superhuman dwellings, and Frankenstein now imagines himself (and even 
believes himself) to be one of the superhuman craftsmen of these “white and shining 
pyramids.” Once blind to beauty, Frankenstein now appears deeply philosophically 
reflective and acutely sensitive to the richly textured transitions in his aesthetic field, from 
natural sublimity, to grand human beauty, to superhuman sublimity, finally to the whole 
experience as one of superhuman sublime beauty. 
 While Frankenstein’s aesthetics of mountains bears close resemblance to Kant’s 
study of the sublime, seemingly synthesized with Aristotle’s aesthetics of the beautiful, 
Longinus’s aesthetics in On the Sublime, the first major statement on the sublime, also 
appears deeply to inform the analysis in Frankenstein. Longinus writes in On the Sublime 
that “the Sublime consists in a consummate excellence and distinction of language, and that 
this alone gave to the greatest poets and prose writers their preeminence and clothed them 
with immortal fame” (Longinus, 163). Longinus’s main examples are Plato and Homer for 
their superhuman voices of philosophy and poetry overwhelming the world with genius. Of 
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course, Plato himself in the Ion already identifies the superhuman voice of Homer to be the 
voice of the Muse speaking through him, and overwhelming all of Greece. 
In this more than anything, then, I think, the god is showing us, so that we should be 
in no doubt about it, that these beautiful poems are not human, not even from 
human beings, but are divine and from gods; that poets are nothing but 
representatives of the gods, possessed by whoever possesses them. (Plato, 534d–e, 
942)  
Homer himself claims no less, beginning the Iliad channeling the Muse: “Sing, goddess, the 
anger of Peleus’ son Achilleus and its devastation” (Homer, I, 59). But the superhumanity of 
the Iliad is multifold, for the Muse sings through Homer, rendering him a unique 
superhuman medium, who thereby sings superhumanly of a range of superhuman beings. 
As Longinus writes, “Homer has done his best to make the men in the Iliad gods and the 
gods men” (Longinus, 189). Homer’s sublime soaring song of godlike men like Achilles, and 
manlike gods like Zeus, sets the Iliad high above the range of mere mortals. But perhaps the 
greatest power of the Iliad (or any truly sublime literary work) is to cause the reader to feel 
elation at the thought she herself is somehow the superhuman author of this work. As 
Longinus writes, “For the true sublime naturally elevates us: uplifted with a sense of proud 
exaltation, we are filled with joy and pride, as if we had ourselves produced the very thing 
we heard” (Longinus, 179). This wonderful experience is exactly Frankenstein’s experience 
beholding the mountains and glaciers and castles in sublime exaltation as if he among the 
alien craftsmen had created all before him. Frankenstein feels as if he were a superhuman 
maker of superhumanly beautiful and sublime things, and not the inhuman maker of the 
dead yellow eyes of a walking corpse. His experience is perfect. 
Frankenstein’s study of the beautiful and the sublime also bears resemblance to 
Santayana’s aesthetics in The Sense of Beauty: Being the Outlines of Æsthetic Theory (1896). 
As Santayana writes, “the sublime is not the ugly, as some descriptions of it might lead us to 
suppose; it is the supremely, the intoxicatingly beautiful” (Santayana, 151). Here Santayana 
defines the sublime as superhuman beauty (having already defined beauty as “pleasure 
objectified”), and categorically excludes ugliness from beauty and sublimity. Santayana also 
describes the experience of the sublime in quite Longinian terms, as entailing the 
identification of the reader or beholder with superhuman things or beings. 
The surprised enlargement of vision, the sudden escape from our ordinary interests 
and the identification of ourselves with something permanent and superhuman, 
something much more abstract and inalienable than our changing personality, all 
this carries us away from the private tragedies before us, and raises us into a sort of 
ecstasy. (Santayana, 152–153) 
Frankenstein similarly describes his sublime experience as carrying him away from his 
private tragedy, by power of enlargement of experience, and a corresponding identification 
with “something permanent and superhuman,” in Santayana’s terms, namely, the race of 
gods and the icy pyramids they built, and the “ever-moving glacier” which fills 
Frankenstein with “sublime ecstasy” (Shelley, 93–94). In Longinus’s terms, Frankenstein 
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feels “uplifted with a sense of proud exaltation,” as if he himself built the icy mountain 
pyramids. This feeling of “proud exaltation” is exactly the feeling Frankenstein sought in 
producing the artificial man, and only this feeling (in the mountains) can make him truly 
forget what he actually produced in the laboratory. 
5. The Monster in the Mountains 
Frankenstein feels calm and at home in the sublime mountains. But while contemplating 
the icy pyramids and stormy weather and his own corresponding emotions, suddenly 
Frankenstein’s aesthetic experience shatters and melts: “I suddenly beheld the figure of a 
man, at some distance, advancing towards me with superhuman speed. He bounded over 
the crevices in the ice, among which I had walked with caution” (Shelley, 95). The monster 
runs and jumps over vast crevices in the snow as if he were formed by nature (rather than 
science) to master this treacherous wilderness of glacier and mountain. “He approached; 
his countenance bespoke bitter anguish, combined with disdain and malignity, while its 
unearthly ugliness rendered it almost too horrible for human eyes” (95). Previously 
Frankenstein contemplated castles and mountains too wondrously beautiful for human 
eyes, but now the monster, “too horrible for human eyes,” blinds Frankenstein to beauty 
and sublimity with loathing. 
 Some may suggest the appearance of the monster merely transforms (rather than 
destroys) the sublimity of the mountains for Frankenstein, because ugliness (so some 
claim) can be sublime. For example, prior to Frankenstein, Burke allows for the aesthetic 
pleasure of the sublimely ugly, in his Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the 
Sublime and Beautiful. As Burke writes, “Ugliness I imagine … to be consistent enough with 
an idea of the sublime. But I would by no means insinuate that ugliness of itself is a sublime 
idea, unless united with such qualities as excite a strong terror” (Burke, 109). For Burke, 
the reason ugliness must be so extreme as to be terrifying in order to be sublime is that 
terror is the essence of the sublime, a definition somewhat recalling Aristotle’s aesthetics of 
terror in the Poetics. As Burke writes, “Indeed, terror is in all cases whatsoever, either more 
openly or latently the ruling principle of the sublime” (Burke, 54). Of course, in 
Frankenstein the monster’s ugliness incites terror, so apparently the monster’s appearance 
would determine the judgment of the sublime. But the monster’s ugliness is so disturbingly 
disgustingly terrifying that it always incites loathing, and loathing destroys aesthetic 
pleasure completely. As Kant writes in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, “only one kind 
of ugliness cannot be represented in a way adequate to nature without destroying all 
aesthetic satisfaction, hence beauty in art, namely, that which arouses loathing” (Kant, 
2001, 5: 312, 190). In Frankenstein the monster’s ugliness unavoidably and immediately 
arouses loathing, and therefore “destroys all aesthetic satisfaction,” and therefore 
undermines the possibility of sublimity. 
By undermining all possible aesthetic pleasure, the monster also determines in the 
mind of the beholder a judgment of the evil. According to Santayana in The Sense of Beauty,  
That we are endowed with the sense of beauty is a pure gain which brings no evil 
with it. When the ugly ceases to be amusing or merely uninteresting and becomes 
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disgusting, it becomes indeed a positive evil: but a moral and practical, not an 
æsthetic one. (Santayana, 33)  
For Santayana, sublimity is beauty perfected, and beauty carries no pain or evil, no 
negativity, so sublimity can carry no pain, e.g., from terror. Beauty and sublimity, for 
Santayana (against Burke), are unmixed with pain or evil or ugliness. Santayana returns to 
this point later in The Sense of Beauty, referring to “that part of our definition of beauty 
which declares that the values beauty contains are all positive” (Santayana, 151). By 
contrast, according to Santayana, the ugly may be “amusing” or “interesting,” but when the 
ugly becomes extreme, in the form of the disgusting, then the ugly leaves the sphere of the 
aesthetic, and enters the sphere of the practical (or moral), and becomes “evil,” and this is 
exactly what happens in Frankenstein. The monster, by appearance alone “more hideous 
than belongs to humanity” (Shelley, 73), leaves the sphere of the aesthetic, and enters the 
sphere of the practical to determine a judgment of “positive evil,” in Santayana’s sense, 
rendering the monster a “filthy daemon” (Shelley, 73). But the monster’s aesthetic 
appearance, forcing the practical judgment of the filthy or the evil, also forces the further 
ontological judgment of inhumanity, and this aesthetic-practical-ontological judgment of 
inhumanity also entails a strange kind of contradiction. On the one hand, the monster bears 
the general shape of a man, and he possesses the species-defining traits of reason and 
human emotion. On the other hand, none can recognize him as a man or identify with him 
as another because of his hideous form. The monster is both human and not human, and 
while society may fail to grasp this contradiction philosophically its members cannot fail to 
solve it practically by exile or death. 
Frankenstein yells at the monster: “Begone, vile insect! or rather, stay, that I may 
trample you to dust!” (Shelley, 96). The monster is unsurprised by Frankenstein’s reaction: 
“‘I expected this reception, said the daemon.’ All men hate the wretched; how, then, must I 
be hated, who am miserable beyond all living things!” (96). If the monster’s inhuman 
appearance once seemed consistent with his prelinguistic “inarticulate sounds,” that same 
appearance now strikingly contrasts with his articulate and even eloquent voice, as he 
speaks philosophically in universals and particulars. Frankenstein, by contrast, is suddenly 
insane with hatred and horror: “Abhorred monster!” “Wretched devil!” (96). The shock of 
horror and hatred seems to derange the intoxicating philosophical contemplation of the 
mountains and valley and glacier, and even appears to derange Frankenstein’s judgment of 
magnitude. The sight of the monster is so aesthetically horrible that it seems even to distort 
the foundations of human reason, as if judgment (and possibly the whole higher power of 
reason) were ultimately grounded in taste. Previously Frankenstein imagined himself a 
giant like the giants who built the icy pyramids and laid the glacier gently between them, a 
giant alone in the mountains, at home in the mountains. But then the comparatively tiny 
monster appears, and somewhat like Medusa aesthetically stuns Frankenstein’s intellect so 
that he cannot break free of his self-image as a giant. Newly enraged but apparently still 
thinking himself a giant, Frankenstein even threatens to “trample” the monster as if it were 
some “vile insect” crawling the floors of superhuman castles and pyramids made by gods 
and giants like Frankenstein himself. 
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Irrationally Frankenstein attacks the monster, but the monster casually steps aside 
and calmly proceeds to instruct the so-called man of knowledge on the futility of violence: 
“Remember, thou hast made me more powerful than thyself; my height is superior to thine, 
my joints more supple. But I will not be tempted to set myself in opposition to thee” 
(Shelley, 96). The monster seems to understand that his very appearance deranges the 
judgment of others, and yet he speaks still rationally and even fatherly on the immorality of 
violence: “You purpose to kill me. How dare you sport thus with life?” (96). Frankenstein 
would crush the monster like an insect, without thought of the insect’s humanity, but the 
monster charges him with immorality for violence even against life itself. But after the 
monster scolds Frankenstein for violence, as if Frankenstein were the monster’s son, the 
monster reminds Frankenstein that he is the monster’s father. The monster says, 
“Remember, that I am thy creature; I ought to be thy Adam, but I am rather the fallen angel, 
whom thou drivest from joy for no misdeed” (96–97). The roles of the monster and the 
man now appear to be completely reversed. The father has become a rash and irrational 
child, and the child a wise and fatherly man. The natural philosopher has become a violent 
monster, and the monster a reflective philosopher. As Bloom writes, “The greatest paradox 
and most astonishing achievement of Mary Shelley’s novel is that the monster is more 
human than his creator” (Bloom, 4). 
The monster says he lives in the caves of these mountains: “The desert mountains 
and dreary glaciers are my refuge. I have wandered here many days; the caves of ice, which 
I only do not fear, are a dwelling to me, and the only one which man does not grudge” 
(Shelley, 97). Earlier Frankenstein beheld the ruined castles as beautiful, and the 
mountains as sublime dwellings crafted by a higher race of beings, and found these sublime 
dwellings to render the castles sublime, and himself a giant dwelling amidst these 
superhuman pyramids. But now the hideous monster claims these superhuman dwellings 
to be his home, thereby presumably rendering in the mind of Frankenstein the mountains 
and glacier and castles as hideous and horrible as the monster himself. If the monster were 
a man and not a monster, a man who had left society to live alone in a mountain cave or a 
ruined mountain castle to become a philosopher king of ice and sky, then Frankenstein 
might think the hermit godlike and sublime, and this sublimity even to augment the 
sublime beauty of the mountains. As Kant writes in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, 
“To be self-sufficient, hence not to need society, yet without being unsociable, i.e., fleeing it, 
is something that comes close to the sublime, just like any superiority over needs” (Kant, 5: 
275, 157). History and literature present several examples of the sublime hermit in the 
wilderness, e.g., the wizard Merlin in the forest in the legend of King Arthur, Henry David 
Thoreau in his cabin in the woods by Walden Pond, and Zarathustra in his mountain cave in 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, each of whom by his presence augments the 
sublimity of the wilderness. But the monster in Frankenstein, while physically self-
sufficient, is not superior to the needs of society, and by his presence in the mountains 
degrades the mountains, and degrades nature as a whole. 
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6. The Monster’s Philosophy 
Once Frankenstein’s mind stabilizes and adjusts, the monster proceeds to unfold his life 
story. After his abandonment the monster left civilization and entered the wilderness and 
learned about nature from experience. The monster explains that he learned to speak by 
observing the inhabitants of a cottage and imitating their vocal gestures, this power of 
imitation being natural to all human minds. As Aristotle writes in Poetics 4, “Imitation is 
natural to man from childhood, one of his advantages over the lower animals being this, 
that he is the most imitative creature in the world, and learns at first by imitation” 
(Aristotle, vol. 2, 1448b5–9, 2318). Once inside language the monster understands that this 
“godlike science” of language defines humanity (Shelley, 108). As Aristotle writes in 
Nicomachean Ethics X.7, “intellect more than anything else is man” (Aristotle, vol. 2, 
1178a7–8, 1862). Yet with his increasing understanding of the “godlike science,” the 
monster feels an increasing desire to enter the village, to be with others. 
“… I easily perceived that, although I eagerly longed to discover myself to the 
cottagers, I ought not to make the attempt until I had first become master of their 
language; which knowledge might enable me to make them overlook the deformity 
of my figure; for with this also the contrast perpetually presented to my eyes had 
made me acquainted.” (Shelley, 110) 
As the monster studies the magical language of the villagers, he knows himself to be one of 
them. But as the monster beholds their magically beautiful forms, he knows himself to be 
horribly different. As the monster recalls, “I had admired the perfect forms of my cottagers 
– their grace, beauty, and delicate complexions: but was I terrified, when I viewed myself in 
a transparent pool!” (110). Narcissus in Greek mythology beholds his reflection in a pool of 
water and cannot bear to look away and falls in love and cannot even bear to live if the pool 
be only a reflection. But when the monster beholds his reflection in a pool he cannot bear 
to see it and can barely bear to live knowing others see it too. Joyce Carol Oates, in 
“Frankenstein’s Fallen Angel,” finds this scene of the mirror pool to be a reflection, not on 
Narcissus, but on Eve in Milton’s Paradise Lost (lines 456–66). Oates writes,  
When the demon terrifies himself by seeing his reflection in a pool, and grasping at 
once the nature of his own deformity, he is surely not mirroring Narcissus, as some 
commentators have suggested, but Milton’s Eve in her surprised discovery of her 
own beauty, in book 4 of Paradise Lost. (Oates, 547) 
Oates is right to highlight the scene of Eve beholding her reflection, especially considering 
that Paradise Lost informs Frankenstein from beginning to end, beginning with an epigraph 
from the epic (Shelley, 1). 
Did I request thee, Maker, from my clay 
To mould me man? Did I solicit thee 
From darkness to promote me?—  
PARADISE LOST. 
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But perhaps reflections of both Narcissus and Eve appear in the monster’s description of 
the pool, for the monster throughout his dialogue seems to see himself in the whole of 
European history and literature, as if that tradition were itself a kind of mind, like “the 
mind of Europe” in T. S. Eliot’s  “Tradition and Individual Talent” (Eliot, 39, 43). As the 
monster sees himself visually in the mirror of the pool, he sees himself intellectually in the 
mirror of the mind of Europe, which includes Narcissus and Milton’s Eve. 
In any case, the monster now presents the problem of his unique form of self-
consciousness arising from these two opposed self-images. On the one hand, he is the 
hideous and gigantic monster he sees in the pool who terrifies and disgusts all, including 
himself. On the other hand, he is a rational (and highly intelligent) creature reasoning 
about being a rational creature, but also reasoning about being a hideous and gigantic 
monster, and reasoning about the opposition of these two self-images. But reason is 
intrinsically social and intersubjective, so rational creatures must live in society with 
others who recognize themselves in one another. But the monster cannot enter society 
because he is inhumanly hideous and gigantic. Yet he must enter society if he is to become 
part of society. So the monster forms a rational solution to his aesthetic problem. He knows 
humanity defines itself by reason rather than physical appearance, so if he can master their 
“godlike science,” then they should (in principle) embrace him, even if with difficulty. After 
all, human beings, the monster believes, cannot be so shallow as his reflection in the pool. 
Their intellects and their love must be infinitely deep. 
“I looked upon them as superior beings, who would be the arbiters of my future 
destiny. I formed in my imagination a thousand pictures of presenting myself to 
them, and their reception of me. I imagined that they would be disgusted, until, by 
my gentle demeanour and conciliating words, I should first win their favour, and 
afterwards their love.” (Shelley, 111) 
The monster plots to offset humanity’s natural revulsion with warmth and gentility and 
flowing eloquence, for that is all the beauty he can offer. 
But this first strategy is fundamentally flawed. As the monster recalls, “I did not yet 
entirely know the fatal effects of this miserable deformity” (110). The monster discovers he 
was wrong about humanity because humanity is wrong about itself. Humanity defines itself 
as rational but unconsciously maintains an invisible but very real aesthetic and ontological 
perimeter around itself. This perimeter preserves the beauty of all its forms and practices 
and excludes by unspoken standards of taste what threatens aesthetic uniformity. So long 
as man remains with man and woman, and society holds each in rapture of each and all, no 
man can truly see himself. But a man like the monster, completely aesthetically removed, 
may yet see and know himself a man (and not a man), may yet see taste beneath reason, 
informing reason, and demanding beauty. Humanity is blind to this unity of taste and 
ontology within itself, and therefore blind to itself, but the monster has no choice and sees 
it. He sees it in the pool. Beauty, the monster now knows, bewitches all men and women, 
and makes them men and women. 
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If the monster’s philosophical conclusions seem extreme in their opposition to 
Aristotle’s definition of man and woman as the “rational animals,” Aristotle himself in 
Politics I.2 also draws an invisible perimeter around the state excluding certain rational 
creatures. 
Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a 
political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, 
is either a bad man or above humanity; he is like the  
Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one, 
whom Homer denounces—the natural outcast is forthwith a lover of war; he may be 
compared to an isolated piece at draughts. (Aristotle, vol. 2, 1253a2–6, 1988–1989) 
The state is a natural whole, and all men and women are linguistic and political parts of this 
whole, but the bad man or monstrous man or godlike man can be no part of the state, and 
each instead appears as a lone piece in a game without a board. Aristotle again draws the 
perimeter of the state when he writes in Politics I.2, “he who is unable to live in society, or 
who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is 
no part of the state” (Aristotle, vol. 2, 1253a27–30, 1988). Kant in the Critique of the Power 
of Judgment seems to have in mind this same view of the self-sufficient demigod, in 
describing the sublimely self-sufficient hermit in the woods. Later in Politics III.13 Aristotle 
writes, if a “god among men” were to appear in the state, then he or she must be 
assassinated, or exiled, or crowned absolute monarch, this last solution being Aristotle’s 
preferred solution, and even his ideal state (cf. Politics III.17 and VII.14; see also 
Nicomachean Ethics VII.1, 1145a15–27, 1809–1810). The monster of Frankenstein appears 
to be a distorted mirror image of Aristotle’s “god among men,” a superhuman monster who 
can be no part of society, and who must live in exile in the wilderness, lest Frankenstein or 
another assassinate him; and yet, apparently, the monster himself would be king of his own 
domain if only he had a queen by his side. 
The monster knows he can be no part of human society, and painfully beholds the 
happiness he would enjoy if only he had been designed with love instead of pride: 
“Everywhere I see bliss, from which I alone am irrevocably excluded” (Shelley, 97). The 
monster is distraught. “Was I, then, a monster, a blot upon the earth, from which all men 
fled and whom all men disowned?” (117). The monster knows humanity will always 
identify him as a blot on existence, but somehow he refuses that definition and instead 
returns to inquiry into his nature, a very human thing to do. 
“My person was hideous and my stature gigantic. What did this mean? Who was I? 
What was I? Whence did I come? What was my destination? These questions 
continually recurred, but I was unable to solve them.” (125) 
The questions the monster poses, “Who was I? What was I? Whence did I come?” are 
questions all rational creatures pose. But they pose these questions because they are 
rational creatures among other rational creatures. The monster poses these same 
questions because he is a rational creature who cannot be recognized as a rational 
creature, and therefore cannot live as a rational creature. The contradiction is maddening. 
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“I exclaimed in agony. ‘Accursed creator! Why did you form a monster so hideous 
that even you turned from me in disgust? God, in pity, made man beautiful and 
alluring, after his own image; but my form is a filthy type of yours, more horrid even 
from the very resemblance. Satan had his companions, fellow-devils, to admire and 
encourage him; but I am solitary and abhorred.’” (126)  
Frankenstein once imagined his creation to be the first of many who would love and honor 
their creator: “A new species would bless me as its creator and source; many happy and 
excellent natures would owe their being to me” (Shelley, 52). Now the opposite has 
transpired as the monster curses his creator for forming a being more hideous than Dante’s 
demons, more hideous precisely for the monster’s “very resemblance” to humanity, and for 
that eternally alone. Even Satan in Milton’s Paradise Lost enjoyed the honor and friendship 
of the fallen angels, but perhaps even they would find the monster unthinkably hideous and 
form for him a separate prison in the depths of Pandemonium. A friend is “another self,” 
writes Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics IX.4 (Aristotle, vol. 2, 1169b3–10, 1848), but because 
the monster has no other aesthetic self he can have no friend, and because he can have no 
friend he can never be happy or fully a man. 
G. W. F. Hegel in the Phenomenology of Spirit claims a reflective self-consciousness is 
an “‘I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is ‘I’” (Hegel, 110). The monster of Frankenstein is both an 
“I” and a “we” because he is an individually embodied being in language (which is social), 
but paradoxically he cannot be a “we” because there are no others like him, and therefore 
he cannot be a fully reflective “I.” Faced with the impossibility of recognition by humanity, 
the monster formulates his second solution to his problem. The monster can be another 
self and an “I” and a “we” but only if his other self is another monster. So the monster 
makes his demand of Frankenstein: “You must create a female for me, with whom I can live 
in the interchange of those sympathies necessary for my being. This you alone can do” 
(Shelley, 140). The monster also demands Frankenstein make the female monster similarly 
gigantic and hideous: “My companion must be of the same species, and have the same 
defects” (139). The monster still recognizes himself as a rational creature, but now also 
distinguishes his species “monster” from the species “human,” and on aesthetic grounds 
alone. 
Frankenstein naturally resists, thinking another monster would be another 
malicious monster, but the monster illuminates the cause of his malice: “I am malicious 
because I am miserable” (140). Why should the monster respect men and women of society 
if they despise him for his ugliness when he would love and protect them should they 
extend him the slightest kindness? The monster says, 
“Shall I respect man when he contemns me? Let him live with me in the interchange 
of kindness; and, instead of injury I would bestow every benefit upon him with tears 
of gratitude at his acceptance. But that cannot be; the human senses are 
insurmountable barriers to our union.” (140)  
The senses beholding aesthetic horror determine a judgment of inhumanity and undermine 
immediately any potential recognition of the monster as human. The human senses alone 
simultaneously and paradoxically define and exclude the monster from his nature, and 
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thereby cause his misery and ultimately his malice. The monster acknowledges his bad 
actions but also instructs Frankenstein that any man in such condition must be a bad man, 
and yet even a monster might be a good man if allowed to live in peace with a woman who 
loves him. 
“If I have no ties and no affections, hatred and vice must be my portion; the love of 
another will destroy the cause of my crimes, and I shall become a thing of whose 
existence every one will be ignorant. My vices are the children of a forced solitude 
that I abhor; and my virtues will necessarily arise when I live in communion with an 
equal.” (142) 
If only he would construct a female monster, says the monster, then Frankenstein would 
never have to behold his creations again, no one would, because the two monsters would 
flee Europe for the wilderness of the new world and live their lives in secret and peace. The 
monster says, “The picture I present to you is peaceful and human, and you must feel that 
you could deny it only in the wantonness of power and cruelty” (141). The monster, so 
human in so many ways, appeals to Frankenstein’s deepest sense of humanity, even as a 
son to a father. 
Frankenstein appreciates the apparent rationality of the solution to the problem, 
and even reluctantly begins, but he who once lacked foresight now clearly sees the future. 
The monsters may flee Europe to live quietly and peacefully in the wilderness of the new 
world, but they will not die alone in that wilderness. They will want children, and their 
children will want children. This monstrous Adam and Eve will populate the wilderness 
with monsters, and these monsters will eventually return to civilization. Frankenstein 
considers this future in language recalling Kant’s image of the “race of devils” or “nation of 
devils” in “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch” (Kant, 1995, 112). 
“Even if they were to leave Europe, and inhabit the deserts of the new world, yet one 
of the first results of those sympathies for which the daemon thirsted would be 
children, and a race of devils would be propagated upon the earth, who might make 
the very existence of the species of man a condition precarious and full of terror.” 
(Shelley, 160) 
Later and again speaking as a practical (and somewhat utilitarian) philosopher 
Frankenstein recalls his decision to deny his artificial son happiness. 
“My duties towards the beings of my own species had greater claims to my 
attention, because they included a greater proportion of happiness or misery. Urged 
by this view, I refused, and I did right in refusing, to create a companion for the first 
creature.” (209) 
If initially he failed to grasp beauty as fundamental to humanity’s self-understanding, 
Frankenstein at last understands the foundational importance of preserving the aesthetic-
ontological perimeter of humanity against the hideous and the monstrous and the 
disgusting. If once he hoped to stand godlike to a new race of beings, Frankenstein 
ultimately stands fast for all humanity against the monster’s happiness, however human he 
may be. 
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In conclusion, Shelley’s Frankenstein is a rich literary investigation of humanity’s self-
understanding, and a subtle philosophical argument against the classical and longstanding 
Aristotelian definition of man and woman as rational animals. Shelley’s greatest 
achievement in Frankenstein is to reveal this ethereal self-image to be a mask crafted and 
upheld unconsciously by society throughout history, and then to lift this glittering mask of 
reason, thereby revealing the true nature of humanity to be beauty and love of beauty. 
Instead of the godlike animals inhabiting the pure realm of reason, men and women are, in 
fact, the godlike animals charmed and transfixed by the ethereal beauty of nature in all its 
forms, in all its forests and roses and butterflies and leopards and wolves, in all their 
splendor and elegance and grace of form, the aesthetic animals enamored and bewitched 
by the superhuman sublimity of mountains and glaciers and stars, and above all one 
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